Afghanistan is one of the countries that received the highest amount of ODI over the past 20 years [1], yet poverty has lately been on the rise [2]. Aid is heavily politicized and the fight against corruption has shown limited success [3]. Consequently, the aid sector is affected by a fundamental lack of trust: high ranking officials of the Afghan government have repeatedly expressed their distrust of aid actors (see for example, tweets of Vice President Amrullah Saleh) [4]; the people the sector aims to assist trust neither aid actors nor their government [5]; and aid actors at times even distrust their own ‘beneficiaries’, as shown by ever longer assessment templates and the widespread use of vocabulary such as ‘fake’ or ‘ghost’ beneficiaries.

When I started working in Afghanistan in 2016, I thought of these issues mostly as technical problems. We were in a high-risk environment – community engagement was confined to a necessary minimum by security concerns. The political situation was volatile – project runtimes as set by donors were often short, and did not allow the time that would have been necessary for trust-building on community-level. The number of technical problems I identified was getting higher and higher, and I kept a long list for myself of what I thought ‘is wrong with aid’ in Afghanistan. Despite of nights of brainstorming, design-thinking and google-ing the internet up and down, the list of solutions my colleagues and I identified always fell short.

It was the “From Voices to Choices” report of IARAN that made me realise in an instant that what I had looked at as just a high number of isolated problems with isolated solutions is in reality a systemic issue with one, single decisive factor at its core: the power over aid decision-making. The report offers a number of tangible starting points to work towards a power-shift in aid decision-making. However, the report is written with the global aid system as such in mind. After I got over the initial exhilaration of having found a community of people that were thinking in the same direction as myself, I started wondering if the inertia and external trends presented were also applicable to the Afghan context, and to which extent. In the following I want to offer a brief analysis on that. 

First of all, quick fact-check: Do Afghan crisis-affected people ‘report having extremely limited ability to influence the aid decisions that affect them’ [6]?

The Humanitarian Voice Index of Ground Truth Solutions suggests that that is the case [7]. In 2018, only 39 percent of interviewed Afghans felt informed about aid, and equally 39 percent felt that their opinion is considered. Comparing these percentages with respondents from other countries shows, that Afghanistan falls somewhere in the middle field. Looking at the long history of aid in Afghanistan and the presence of many highly specialized humanitarian actors, this is disappointing.

The “From Voices to Choices” report identifies four powerful inertia to the formal humanitarian sector: the aid power / incentive structure, donor interest, the bureaucratic and risk averse aid system and the aid worldview. I will restrict myself here to presenting just one example from Afghanistan that proves that all these inertia are common.

Funding and power is concentrated in Afghanistan within international actors, as shown for instance by the amount of funding that is distributed by the Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund (AHF) – in 2020, less than 10 percent of the total funding (more than 74 million USD) went to national NGOs directly [8]. The remaining funds were allocated to UN agencies, the Red Cross / Red Crescent movement and international NGOs, that likely subbed to local organizations to a certain extent.

Funding cycles in Afghanistan are often short-term, and do not provide sufficient time or funding for program design with crisis-affected people. In 2017, the Allocation Strategy Paper of the Common Humanitarian Fund (later renamed into AHF) First Standard Allocation had allocated in its timeline 23 calendar days for proposal development, spanning over Christmas and New Year. Project duration was allowed to be between 6 to 12 months maximum.

The aid system in Afghanistan is very bureaucratic and risk averse. Due diligence processes by donors and international NGOs can make it difficult to work with local, community-based organisations. Proof of that can be read on the AHF’s webpage: “The Due Diligence Review is meant to ensure that only organizations that meet the minimum requirements are recommended for step two, i.e. the Partner Capacity Assessment, as it is a time-consuming and costly process for the partner and the Humanitarian Financing Unit.” [9]

The formal humanitarian sector prevalent in Afghanistan is certainly valuing technical expertise and Western management practices over contextual understanding, local knowledge and lived experience. I have rarely participated in high-level meetings of the Afghan aid community in which Afghans were the majority. The Advisory Board of the AHF’s membership structure is stipulated in the Operational Manual: from 3 representatives of the NGO community, only 1 is foreseen to be a representative of a national NGO. This means that in a panel consisting of 12 people in total, 11 board members are by definition employed by foreign agencies and in all likelihood, international staff members [10].

Powerful inertia are at play in the formal humanitarian sector in Afghanistan – it is therefore no surprise that Afghan people are not yet in the driver seat of humanitarian action. But what about external trends that were identified by the IARAN: technology, urbanization, youth and education, environmental change, international migration, the changing nature of conflict and violence, and the resurgence of sovereignty and nationalism. Are they likely to have an influence on the humanitarian ecosystem in Afghanistan? And how can we leverage them to drive the participation revolution forward?

Telecom services cover today over 90 percent of the population, and the mobile market is steadily on the rise. Between 2013 and 2019, mobile broadband penetration rose from 1 to 22 percent [11]. In 2018, 13.5 percent of the population identified as internet users, and per 100 people, 59 mobile phone subscriptions were registered [12]. At the same time, financial inclusion is low in Afghanistan, with almost 85 percent of adults unbanked, and only 7 percent of women in Afghanistan owning a bank account [13]. The combination of these two factors has the potential to open up space for new communication and financial technology, and indeed, first actors specialized on mobile-based approaches have entered the scene [14]. For formal humanitarian actors this offers easy opportunities to enable choices by opting for cash-based programming, and engaging new actors in developing ICT-based concepts for programme development, monitoring and evaluation. Beneficiary feedback mechanisms are only the bare minimum – go beyond! Engage the people you aim to assist in every aspect of your work – and transfer decision-making power to the people who are affected by those decisions. Unlock the possibilities of communication technology – interactive voice response has the power to include illiterate population groups, and already in 2013 it was estimated that 80 percent of the female population had access to mobile communication in one way or the other [15]. There is nothing holding you back.

Afghanistan experienced a rapid urbanization in the past years [16]. Urban contexts offer great opportunities in terms of communication technology, as relatively more people are connected to the internet as compared to rural areas. At the same time, local urban organizations already got in the spotlight during Afghanistan’s peak of the Covid-19 crisis in mid-2020, as local media outlets organized fund-raising campaigns and calls for action to support their local neighbourhoods [17]. For aid actors operating in urban areas in Afghanistan, the conditions are ideal to engage beneficiaries meaningfully and to seek out unusual and new partnerships with local actors.

Afghanistan’s population growth rate is one of the highest in the world and close to 3 percent. This will lead to a doubling of the population within the next 25 years. 47.5 percent of the population is aged 15 or below, and more than 400,000 youth seek to enter the labour force every year – more than the economy can absorb [18]. Almost 20 percent of the labour force are today classified as having an ‘intermediate or advanced education’ [19]. There is no doubt that youth will be a strong driver of change in Afghanistan, and likely claim a say in decision-making processes that will affect their futures.

In 2019, Afghanistan was ranked the sixth most affected country in the world by climate change, and in the collective ranking from 2000-2019 ranks among the 20 most affected by climate risks in the form of extreme weather events [20]. In a country in which 61 percent of the population derives income from agriculture [21], finding local solutions will be critical. Particularly in combination with a growing population, these two factors are likely to further speed up urbanization – 2018 already saw large population groups on the move as drought conditions had affected farmers’ livelihoods [22]. A diversification of funding sources and increased aid effectiveness are necessary to ensure that displaced and jobless Afghans have the means to re-establish their livelihoods when needs increase.

Afghanistan was ranking 10th in the list of origin countries of international migration in 2019, with about 5 million international migrants (referring to the cumulated number) [23]. I want to reiterate here that any movement, be it within or beyond international borders, “is a means through which people have, and will continue to exercise, agency in meeting their immediate and long-term needs” [24]. Calls for ‘return-to-origin’ are misguided when root causes of displacement and migration are not addressed. The majority of Afghan migrants choose Iran and Pakistan as destinations, but a small minority moves on to Europe, which might open interesting opportunities for donors and international aid actors to connect with local organizations and initiatives through the diaspora.

The war in Afghanistan is complex and protracted, and is often called ‘the world’s most lethal conflict’ [25]. Remote management became a reality for many actors, as a quarter of the country’s districts are today classified as ‘hard-to-reach’ [26]. The Humanitarian Access Group recorded a 150 percent increase in access constraints from 2019 to 2020 [27]. This loops back to the advances in technology – putting communication systems in place now will ensure that crisis-affected people are not cut-off from participating in aid decision-making in future. And again, it underlines the strong need to engage national and local actors meaningfully – beyond merely transferring security risks without a corresponding transfer of power. Let go of the ‘capacity building’ paradigm that stems form a Westernized, technocratic worldview.

In 2020, the NGO community united to fight back restrictions on civil society that were included in the new NGO law, released in draft version by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan [28]. At the same time, the Taliban released statements claiming they “will not allow aid agencies to work against the interest of Afghanistan” [29]. It seems that, no matter where the intra-Afghan peace talks will end at, NGOs and civil society will be affected negatively through nationalist and protectionist agendas. A mindset based on competition for funding and enslaving aid to the demon of organizational growth will play into the hands of those who want to put their agendas forward. It is now the time to forge strong alliances and networks that include international, national and local humanitarian actors on eye level, rooted in trust and mutual interests, and jointly advocating to put crisis-affected people first.

The inertia to the humanitarian sector and external trends identified in the “From Voices to Choices” report are all observable in Afghanistan. This means that also identified approaches to support transformative participation are applicable to the context: Redefine growth away from bigger organizations and towards bigger networks by forming strategic partnerships with national and local actors. Flip the human resource paradigm by hiring people with necessary skill sets, such as local languages, knowledge of local contexts and collaborative decision-making and problem-solving approaches. Why not introduce co-leadership concepts that match international with national staff for roles that require networking and communication skills within and outside of Afghanistan, such as donor and government liaisons? And please stop hiring people that come to the country primarily to advance their careers and increase the savings on their bank accounts. Go for choice-enabling solutions by leveraging communication technology and cash-based approaches. Support local actors in developing alternative funding streams and getting in touch with the diaspora. And lastly, be a leader: Challenge the power structure and worldview that perpetuates the dominance of formal actors in decision-making. Call out organizations that set-up decision-making structures dominated by international actors, while affecting the live of crisis-affected Afghans. Be an advocate for putting people at the centre of humanitarian action. Promote ‘downward’ accountability whenever possible, and let us, as a sector, regain and deserve the trust of crisis-affected Afghans.

Let us kick-start the participation revolution now.

(This is yet another opinion by a foreigner on how to do aid in Afghanistan – I’m therefore calling out to all Afghans to challenge my views expressed here! Make your voice heard – reach out to IARAN or myself and let us know what you think.)

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 DISCLAIMER: All views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any other agency, organization, employer or company. 

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References

[1] OECD.Stat. Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions.

[2] Nassif, C. and Haque, T. (September 2016.) World Bank Group. Afghanistan in 2030. Priorities for Economic Development under Fragility.

[3] Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (November 2019). SIGAR 20-06 Audit Report.

[4] AmrullahSaleh2 (2020, April 21). Thank you @StateDeptyou’re your kind assistance. We remain grateful & hope this assistance doesn’t go through NGOs who will spend 60 percent of it for furniture, meetings, power point presentation, desk studies & consultancy fees. [Tweet]

[5] The Asia Foundation (2019). A Survey of the Afghan People. Afghanistan in 2019, p. 140-141.

[6] Maietta, M., Kennedy, E., Rundel, T., Bastin, A.K.A., and Watt-Smith, V. (November 2018). From Voices to Choices. Expanding crisis-affected people’s influence over aid decisions: An outlook to 2040, p. 6.

[7] Humanitarian Voice Index by Ground Truth Solutions. Overview of findings.

[8] OCHA. Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund.

[9] OCHA. About the Afghanistan CHF. Eligibility.

[10] OCHA (December 2018). Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund (AHF), AHF Operational Manual.

[11] BuddeComm (November 2020). Afghanistan – Telecoms, Mobile and Broadband – Statistics and Analyses.

[12] UNDP. Human Development Reports, Afghanistan, Human Development Indicators.

[13] Nosher, W. (February 2020). A pathway to financial inclusion in Afghanistan.

[14] See, for instance, IVR polling by VIAOMO in Afghanistan Or AWAAZ, the toll-free complaints hotline established by UNOPS in 2018.

[15] USAID (May 2013). Connecting to Opportunity. A Survey of Afghan Women’s Access to Mobile Technology.

[16] Nassif, C. and Haque, T. (September 2016). World Bank Group. Afghanistan in 2030. Priorities for Economic Development under Fragility.

[17] See, for example: https://www.etilaatroz.com/95702/more-than-1000-people-signed-the-empathy-campaign/

[18] Nassif, C. and Haque, T. (September 2016). World Bank Group. Afghanistan in 2030. Priorities for Economic Development under Fragility.

[19] UNDP. Human Development Reports, Afghanistan, Human Development Indicators. Skilled labour force.

[20] Eckstein, D., Künzel, V. and Schäfer, L. (January 2021). Germanwatch. Global Climate Risk Index 2021.

[21] Nassif, C. and Haque, T. (September 2016). World Bank Group. Afghanistan in 2030. Priorities for Economic Development under Fragility.

[22] Sahak, F. (November 2020). Asia Displacement Solutions Platform. Re-Imagining the Drought Response.

[23] IOM (2019). World Migration Report 2020.

[24] Maietta, M., Kennedy, E., Rundel, T., Bastin, A.K.A., and Watt-Smith, V. (November 2018). From Voices to Choices. Expanding crisis-affected people’s influence over aid decisions: An outlook to 2040, p. 47.

[25] International Crisis Group. Afghanistan.

[26] OCHA Services. Humanitarian Response. Afghanistan. HTR District Map August 2020.

[27] OCHA Services. Humanitarian Response. Afghanistan. HAG Quarterly Report (October to December 2020).

[28] Amnesty International (2020, June 27). Afghanistan: Draft NGO law threatens civil society organizations in Afghanistan.

[29] Sediqi, A.Q. (2020, July 27). Reuters. Taliban push to control private companies, aid agencies in Afghanistan.