Where will the frog land? For years, I have had a recurring debate with my brother-in-law about whether developing countries might actually hold an advantage when it comes to adopting new technologies. He is a staunch techno-optimist, arguing that economies in the Global South can leapfrog over the development stages that more industrialized nations have traversed, adopting cutting-edge digital, energy, and telecommunications technologies without being constrained by legacy systems. My own perspective has been more cautious.
His argument revolves around the idea that developing countries have a relative advantage in adopting new technologies because they are not burdened with extensive pre-existing infrastructure, which in developed economies often conflicts with emerging models of energy distribution, internet networks, or financial services. Costs related to old, existing infrastructure railroads developed economies in a way to continue in the same development path. The example that I have been focusing on lately is the adoption of mobile financial applications such as Wave and Orange Money, the leading service providers in Senegal. These platforms, accessible via smartphones, have reduced reliance on traditional ATMs and bank cards, functioning as intermediaries between households and essential service providers such as electricity and telecommunications. In Europe, comparable apps face strong competition and their adoption is constrained by entrenched systems. In Senegal, however, the expansion of previously underserved areas (Casamance is a great example for this) means that these mobile platforms can introduce liquidity into local economies without the need for new physical infrastructure, at least in theory.
Yet, the trade-offs are clear. Quite anecdotally, I have encountered small retailers who lack access to smartphones and are forced to accept smaller payments, while others lose customers because they cannot process Wave transactions. These experiences underscore the reality that development inevitably leaves some people behind. More striking perhaps is the structural dependency: Senegal does not manufacture smartphones, internet connectivity relies on Orange, a French company, and the applications themselves were founded by American entrepreneurs, while the telecoms infrastructure needed comes from the global north, which incidentally is also where all the data gathered in Africa is treated and stored. In other words, this localized development still hinges on imports and foreign capital, and the value captured by importers cannot be ignored. The central question I have been grappling with is this: can the impact of this initial spark of local development, enabled by the absence of legacy infrastructure and the creative use of new tech affordances, ultimately outweigh the long-term dependencies on external technologies and investment from the Global North?
Mobile money, broadly defined, refers to financial services delivered via mobile phones and supported by a network of agents, allowing users to deposit, withdraw, transfer money, pay bills, or even access credit without relying on traditional bank branches [1]. Cash-in and cash-out operations are typically conducted through local agents, who are pre-existing retailers rather than formal bank employees, making the system highly scalable and accessible. This embodies the promise of technological leapfrogging: the idea that developing countries can bypass intermediate stages of technological infrastructure and achieve rapid gains in financial inclusion, economic resilience, and household empowerment [2]. Yet, as the discussion around leapfrogging reveals, the adoption of mobile money is not just a technical process; it is embedded in broader questions of social capacity, economic dependencies, and the long-term trajectory of development [3].
Mobile money has seen remarkable adoption across Africa over the past two decades. By 2024 there were more than two billion registered accounts globally, with over half a billion monthly active users [4]. Sub-Saharan Africa alone accounted for more than one billion registered accounts (double the number from 2020) and over two-thirds of all registered accounts worldwide. The network of mobile money agents in the region has expanded rapidly, reaching 28 million registered agents, with 10 million active on a monthly basis, allowing users to cash in and cash out, pay bills, top up airtime, and access basic credit and insurance services. In Senegal, mobile money adoption has been robust since the launch of Orange Money in 2011, followed by Wave in 2016, which by 2022 emerged as a market leader. These platforms have transformed financial transactions in urban and rural areas alike, bridging gaps where traditional banks are scarce and enabling households and small businesses to participate more fully in the economy.
The concept of technological leapfrogging has long captivated scholars and policymakers as a potential shortcut for development, allowing countries to bypass legacy infrastructure and adopt modern technologies directly. In Africa, mobile phones exemplify this phenomenon [5]: rapid adoption across the continent in the late 1990s and 2000s enabled millions to communicate, transact, and access financial services without ever relying on fixed-line networks, traditional banks, or formal transport and payment systems. Techno-optimists imagine an even broader horizon: wireless power, automated delivery drones, or decentralized transport systems replacing roads entirely, and suggest that the absence of entrenched infrastructure grants developing countries a comparative advantage, unburdened by path dependency or costly legacy systems. Yet a cautious perspective highlights the limits of this optimism. True leapfrogging requires more than novelty: technologies must be proven, functional, and contextually appropriate, and adoption must enhance human well-being rather than merely increase connectivity or GDP. The paradox of leapfrogging lies in the fact that poverty can constrain adoption, while adoption itself can create new dependencies, entrench inequalities, or sidestep systemic issues rather than solving them [6] [7]. This duality calls for nuanced, evidence-driven analysis: while rapid adoption of mobile money and other digital innovations opens opportunities for inclusion, resilience, and local economic growth, long-term benefits depend on deliberate strategies that integrate these technologies into broader development pathways, strengthen local capacities, and ensure that leapfrogging translates into meaningful improvements in livelihoods rather than temporary workarounds.
At its core, mobile money bypasses traditional banking infrastructure, allowing individuals to store, transfer, and receive funds, pay for utilities, and engage in financial transactions without needing a physical bank branch nearby. In Senegal in 2023, for example, there were only 7.09 ATMs per 100,000 people [8], highlighting the limited physical reach of traditional financial services. Mobile money does not simply represent a technology that advanced economies might adopt if not for entrenched systems; rather, it is intrinsically tied to the structural realities of the countries where adoption has surged, where widespread access to banking is constrained yet financial services remain essential. These platforms leverage new digital technologies to address a gap that Europe or other high-income countries do not experience in the same way, creating a relatively unconstrained space for adoption. Yet, adoption is not automatic: some minimal infrastructure, literacy, and connectivity are typically required to use mobile financial services effectively [9]. Mobile money therefore emerges as an alternative to traditional banking precisely because it responds to the specific opportunities and constraints present in some developing countries, particularly the combination of unmet demand and limited competition from global financial incumbents. This allows developing countries that have had high levels of adoption to explore development pathways that diverge from the trajectories historically followed by the global North, potentially opening avenues for financial inclusion, entrepreneurial activity, and local economic transformation that would be difficult or less efficient in contexts with dense, established banking networks. But what exactly is this path of development going to look like?
In the broader literature around leapfrogging in Africa, and the effects of technological innovation, there are three main contrasting perspectives. The first vision celebrates immediate economic growth and the expansion of mobile money providers themselves, often treating rising transaction volumes, registered accounts, and firm profitability as ends in their own right [10][11]. Here, development is equated with the rapid scaling of financial infrastructures. The second vision takes a more grounded perspective, focusing on the micro-level mechanisms through which individuals and households (embedded in broader macro contexts) adopt and benefit from mobile money [12][13]. This perspective emphasizes innovation and resilience in agriculture, increased household income, regularized employment, and enhanced financial security as markers of meaningful social transformation. Finally, a third vision highlights the structural dependencies and risks created by the diffusion of digital financial technologies [14][15]. Scholars in this tradition urge caution or adopt a critical stance, warning that mobile money’s celebrated successes may also entrench new vulnerabilities, reproduce asymmetries of power, or extend forms of digital colonialism under the guise of inclusion and progress, and cast criticisms over overly optimistic views of the possibility of leapfrogging. Together, these perspectives delineate a spectrum of interpretations: from techno-optimistic growth metrics, to micro-level empowerment, to systemic critique of dependency and inequality.
The vast majority of the research done on the subject of mobile money, the second perspective prevails. This body of work, combining micro-level analyses of adoption with measurements of immediate socioeconomic effects, has been effective at delineating both the drivers of adoption and the channels of impact[16]. Regarding gender, adoption is more likely amongst men, but women that have already adopted it will use it more and benefit more from it [17]. Causal relation between adoption and income growth in individual, household and state level. Mobile money enhances financial inclusion by reducing transaction costs and facilitating remittances, enables more stable consumption smoothing in the face of shocks, and supports business income growth and agricultural commercialization.
However, this vision may be limited in creating a complete image of the long term development impact of mobile money. I read for the first time the distinction between virtual machine and real machine in the commentaries of the author of the 40th anniversary edition of the Selfish Gene, by Richard Dawkins [18]. Broadly speaking, this is a distinction between machines as we see and use them, and machines as the real processes that lie behind the machine. With mobile money, the virtual machine corresponds to the experience of pushing a button on your screen and automatically paying your bills, or transferring money to a family member. The real machine is the real disposition of capital that allows for that interaction, the design and value chain of the mobile phone, telecoms infrastructure and data processing. As long as we focus solely on adoption, and treat the technology as neutral and a given, the true shape of the real machine will stay hidden behind the shadow of how we experience it.
Amongst other things, this vision neglects dependencies created or entrenched through mass adoption of mobile financial services as critics of digital colonialism see it, embedded in the context of the broader late state/surveillance capitalism.The diffusion of mobile money in developing economies must also be seen against the backdrop of external constraints that shape the developing economy's growth.
Dependent on imported capital goods and locked in low value-added production with surplus labor, developing economies cannot sustain endogenous growth in the long run without a favourable international context and structural transformation[19]. The adoption of technologies such as mobile money requires continuous imports of smartphones, telecommunications infrastructure, software services, and digital hardware, further increasing reliance on external suppliers. Unless these imports are balanced by structural transformations that diversify production and strengthen local capabilities, mobile money adoption risks exacerbating the very external constraint it is celebrated for overcoming. Sustainable adoption therefore demands not only local socio-economic transformation but also international cooperation to ensure a favorable global environment.
However, while in order for growth to be sustainable in developing countries in the long term cooperation and a favourable international context are needed, many would argue that the current context of digital colonialism provides exactly the opposite. The data generated by digital capitalism, including mobile money transactions, are rarely stored or processed in the countries of origin [20]. Instead, they are centralized in data centers located in the United States and Europe, where they are exploited without local control, compensation, or oversight. This concentration of control creates multiple layers of dependency: Global South societies rely on foreign infrastructure for essential financial services, while simultaneously losing sovereignty over the data produced by their own populations. These data streams feed machine learning systems and digital platforms that have been shown to reproduce and amplify racial, gender, and geographic biases, further entrenching pre-existing inequalities. The result is a double extraction: communities not only remain dependent on external technology providers, but the very information generated through their economic activity becomes a commodified resource controlled abroad, embedding long-term structural vulnerabilities and reinforcing asymmetries in power, knowledge, and economic opportunity [21]. This underlines the need for local governance, data sovereignty, and policies that mitigate technological dependency while enhancing community resilience.
All of this underscores the need for foresight in development planning. Rather than measuring success solely in terms of adoption or immediate economic effects, policymakers and scholars must anticipate the multiple pathways through which mobile money can shape futures, some beneficial, others harmful. The key questions are not just how quickly mobile money spreads or how much GDP it adds, but who controls the infrastructure, who benefits, and who bears the risks. A sustainable development agenda must empower local actors, build resilience against technological dependency, and ensure that mobile money serves as a means of inclusive human flourishing rather than an instrument of dependency or extraction.
All in all, it is very hard to argue with the immediate positive effects that mobile money brings to the countries where it has reached high adoption levels, both at the state and individual level, and the potential to bring forth positive future innovations. Remittances, now the largest flow of international funds towards developing countries, are facilitated a great deal by these platforms, and some argue they might be at the heart of enabling innovation amongst farmers through access to credit and risk sharing [22]. And more in general, beyond immediate financial and agricultural benefits, mobile money creates new technological affordances (opportunities for action enabled by the system) [23] that interact with existing human, social, and physical capital. These affordances expand the capabilities and agency of users, allowing individuals and communities to reconfigure resources in innovative ways. However, by observing only the effects of adoption, we risk creating a very tilted vision of the effects of this technology if observed from a more holistic point of view.
Ultimately, the story of mobile money, and technological leapfrogging more broadly, reminds us that technologies are not neutral instruments that automatically yield progress. They are shaped by social, economic, and political contexts, and in turn shape these contexts in ways that are contingent and often unpredictable. For development actors, this means moving beyond narrow metrics of adoption, transaction volume, or GDP growth, and instead considering how technologies mediate power, redistribute opportunity, and interact with local capabilities. A holistic vision requires imagining not just what is probable, but what is possible and preferable: how can mobile money and other innovations be guided to enhance resilience, inclusion, and agency, rather than reinforce dependency and inequality? At the same time, we must ask: under what conditions might these same tools which are so promising in theory entrench new asymmetries or create vulnerabilities that outlast their initial benefits? The challenge, then, is to pair technological adoption with foresight, political fantasy, and strategic design, actively shaping the pathways through which innovation contributes to sustainable and equitable human development, rather than leaving the trajectory to chance.
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