INTRODUCTION
Enveloped in what can only be described as one of the largest humanitarian crises of the XXI century (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2024), Sudan has found itself in the midst of a third civil war which erupted in 2023 and has effectively continued up to present day. Thus, the rapidly evolving conflict has proved an immense hurdle for humanitarian work at all levels (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2024; Human Rights Watch, 2024). Far more alarming, however, is the steadily increasing number of internally displaced persons – 11,000,000 IDPs as of the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA, 2024) – in addition to rapid loss of critical civilian infrastructure as a result of indiscriminate targeting by Sudanese opposition and government forces alike (Human Rights Watch, 2024; United Nations Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005), 2024, p. 18).
The current state of affairs in Sudan regarding critical civilian infrastructure – understood within this piece as basic infrastructure needed for civil society to organize its governance practices, i.e. education, health, transportation, communication, and administrative infrastructure – has become even more dire as a result of escalating hostilities between the Rapid Defense Forces and Sudanese Armed Forces in late 2023. Needless to say, although the role of manifested conflict must be acknowledged, it is the general consensus that long periods of infrastructural degradation have deteriorated existing critical assets countrywide (OCHA, 2023, pp. 3-6; Gregory, 2024).
With no end in sight to renewed conflict in Sudan, how exactly does this disastrous loss of critical infrastructure impact Sudanese communities in the urban periphery as opposed to urban centers, and how may the international community better equip their humanitarian toolboxes through open access mapping tools?
SUDANESE HUMANITARIAN CONTEXT
Tracing its origins to an extensive tradition of ethno-political struggles, the spark which ignited open hostilities in 2023 has long simmered. Born during the later stages of the Darfur War, with the reorganization of government-backed Janjaweed militias with the blessing of then Sudanese president, Omar Al-Bashir, the RSF has grown to become Sudan’s largest armed militia group (Abbas, 2023; Council on Foreign Relations, 2024). In part, much of the fighting observed within Darfur by the mid 2010s was directly headed by RSF, which entered into an uneasy peace with Khartoum following the ousting of Al-Bashir by 2019 (CFR, 2024).
Such peace, however, proved to be brittle and untenable as both the RSF and and newly formed Sudanese government in Khartoum, sustained by continued support from the Sudanese Armed Forces, vied for control of both state and resources, primarily government positions, economic viability, and military control over peripheral regions way from the political epicenter of the capital (Abbas, 2023). Thus, by April of 2023, open fighting between the RSF and SAF erupted in the streets of Khartoum, ominously foreshadowing the escalation of conflict between both actors within a much broader scope, affecting heavily populated areas within Sudan while enveloping the whole of the nation in a spree of violence and insecurity.
It is in this panorama in which humanitarian action has unfolded, and unfortunately, faltered. As presented by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the allocation of international funding destined for humanitarian efforts in Sudan as of 2024 in the health and education sectors remains unmet with 52.81% and 90.74% of its total funding requirements still unaccounted for respectively (OCHA Financial Tracking Services (FTS), 2024). But where exactly is available funding being spent? This question proves to be central to the way in which humanitarian aid is conceived of within Sudan, and as made visible through mapping efforts carried out by humanitarian monitoring, the majority of humanitarian efforts have been focused on significant population clusters, primarily within the Khartoum metropolitan region and Darfur (OCHA, 2023, p. 11).
From a traditional humanitarian perspective, this focus makes sense; higher population density often means more issues and greater efficiency for aid efforts (Archer, 2017). However, cross-analysis of OCHA and Humanitarian Action data reveals that civilians in Sudanese urban centers receive significantly more aid than those in peripheral towns and hamlets (OCHA, 2023, p. 11; Humanitarian Action, 2024). This disparity perpetuates inadequate infrastructure monitoring, effectively “erasing” critical facilities outside cities and leaving these areas unmapped and unrepresented.
Figure 1. Own elaboration, data retrieved from (Humanitarian Action, 2024).
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE & INFRASTRUCTURE MAPPING
Critical civilian infrastructure thus, not only acts as tell-tale markers of community and social health in scenarios of active conflict, but furthermore facilitates the coordination of humanitarian aid by providing entry and transportation points for critical materials and goods. Within the Sudanese periphery, one such example which could be recalled are critical railway routes which connect the heartlands of Western and Southern Sudan with the commercial hub and ports of the Upper Nile and Red Sea Coast (Sudan Tribune, 2022).
More importantly, however, is the prospects which the presence of said critical infrastructure presents for small peripheral communities which enjoy access to these services. This being the case, humanitarian mapping, arguably the most important tool for adequate decision making in humanitarian response processes, would be expected to represent these communities as accurately as urban centers which also shelter a variety of critical infrastructure. Nonetheless, Sudan’s critical infrastructure “weak points”, i.e. smaller communities, remain vastly under-mapped as opposed to their much more populated counterparts, as showcased in figure 2.
Figure 2. Aerial satellite imagery comparison of urban mapping between the city of Er Rahad (left) and the town of Dibedad (right). Both localities harbor railway stations belonging to the critical Babanusa-Wau Railway, (OpenStreetMap, 2025).
For now, such vacuums in information remain a looming challenge for the future of humanitarian aid, particularly as individual participation in the process of data collection takes further prominence in an age of rapid digitalization. Already, open-access tools such as OpenStreetMap have broadened the scope of individual participation within the process of knowledge production, though this remains a relatively unknown tool rarely taught by humanitarian actors to communities. With this in mind, as humanitarian response seeks to keep up with the complexities and dynamism of active conflict in Sudan and elsewhere, expanding the infrastructure mapping tool boxes of local actors remains a vastly underexplored way in which humanitarian aid may overcome identified attention biases between urban and rural populations, all while working in tandem with peripheral communities to ensure the visibilization of critical infrastructure and the communities whose lives depend on these services.
FACTORS AT PLAY
1. Targeted attacks against humanitarian networks & infrastructure
The dynamism inherent within the Sudanese conflict has conditioned humanitarian actors’ ability to respond, thus often limiting responses and their reach. Sudan’s unique challenges and rapidly evolving political landscape furthermore drive actors, both combatants and non-combatants, to act in ways which may compromise the stability of humanitarian supply chains. As reported by Genocide Watch (Khan, 2024), armed factions, such as the RSF, have conducted raids on a number of humanitarian organizations which maintain administrative operations in Sudan, this in addition to looting of warehouses utilized to store humanitarian aid. In addition, both the RSF and SAF have a known history of impeding or outright prohibiting the entry of humanitarian assistance within Sudan, further hindering an efficient humanitarian response (Khan, 2024).
2. Duration and nature of conflict development
As expected, the nature of Sudan’s conflict is dynamic and prone to changes in intensity and actor involvement. Key players within the ongoing clash for control of the Sudanese state, such as the RSF, may trace their origins to paramilitary groups active in Sudan since the mid 2010s, showcasing that conditions for, prolonged, mid and low intensity conflicts have long existed in Sudan. As clashes continue, Sudan could see itself enter a new period of low-intensity conflict, aggravating humanitarian crises.
3. Access to Open Mapping Tools
Although extensively utilized by international actors, OCHA being a prime example, cartographic tools like OpenStreetMap continue to be lesser known resources which significantly contribute to communities’ ability to represent themselves while adding their knowledge to a wider humanitarian network. As conventional humanitarian approaches have opted to emphasize a one-way approach to work on the ground, i.e. actor to community, access to or knowledge of open access mapping tools remains limited, particularly outside of urban contexts as showcased by the stark difference in infrastructure mapping between cities and rural settlements.
FORESIGHT SCENARIOS
In order to briefly detail potential future scenarios surrounding critical infrastructure mapping within the context of ongoing high-intensity conflict within Sudan, the following four scenarios are presented with the consideration that two of the aforementioned factors of uncertainty – duration and nature of conflict development and access to open mapping tools – will continue to shape humanitarian aid and its access to critical infrastructure within Sudan.
Scenario 1. High-intensity conflict & minimal access to mapping tools
This scenario remains the most aligned with current trends on the ground. As internal displacement continues to surge past 11,000,000 as a result of conflict, the very social fabric of Sudanese society will begin to deteriorate as a result of systematic violence, accelerated erosion of public institutions and infrastructure, and the inability of individuals to meet basic needs. With more than 9,000 recorded clashes all throughout Sudan (Hussein, 2024), conflict has escalated past localized and restricted low-intensity operations.
Additionally, current mapping efforts have remained largely undertaken at the behest of international actors and non-Sudanese users. As critical communication infrastructure continues to deteriorate due to continued conflict and inability to identify critical weak points in the Sudanese periphery, localized mapping initiatives will remain a niche tool, often confined to urban centers. Consequently, we could expect a continued focus on urban centers, with infrastructure monitoring in rural areas lagging behind, rendering entire communities “invisible” to humanitarian actors.
Scenario 2. Low-intensity conflict & minimal access to mapping tools
Most probable in the long run, Sudan’s peace building process will prove to be arduous and complex, with possible localized infighting to be the most likely outcome following intense conflict. Nonetheless, this may ultimately prove to be disastrous for humanitarian mapping efforts in rural Sudan, with focus directed towards rebuilding key infrastructure in Khartoum and other urban centers. Ultimately, in a scenario where any government is forced to center its efforts within the Khartoum metropolitan region, the periphery may be left to fend for itself.
Moreover, maintaining the underutilization of mapping tools, peripheral communities may find themselves trapped within a cycle of dependence for recognition and restitution, many unable to project their own communities and infrastructure onto the radar of humanitarian actors due to a vacuum of knowledge or invisibilization by traditional humanitarian assessment techniques.
Scenario 3. High-intensity conflict & ample access to mapping tools
Akin in scope to scenario one, conflict in Sudan maintains an accelerated pace of escalation, limiting the ability of humanitarian aid to fully cover all areas in need, something highlighted previously by OCHA. Nonetheless, humanitarian actors may find respite by bolstering collaboration with affected and displaced communities through low-cost and easily replicated information generation tools such as open mapping. In turn, rural communities could not only directly contribute to the expansion of humanitarian assessments of their respective regions, but reassert control over their own representation by self-mapping infrastructure and places of habitation.
Scenario 4. Low-Intensity Conflict & Ample Access to Mapping Tools
Rather similarly, as with scenario two, intense fighting transitions into localized fighting between Khartoum and opposing armed groups, endangering the protection and rehabilitation of Sudan’s rural communities in favor of major cities in the Sudanese heartland. In this scenario, humanitarian focus becomes one of cooperation and tool enabling as the conflict transitions, with international aid diminishing gradually as a result.
Optimistically, peripheral communities adopt accessible tools, such as open mapping, into their processes of recognition. We could expect to see rural mapping taking place, led by members of these communities, and with the primary purpose of visualizing both key infrastructural assets and peoples living in the periphery. This, aside from being a deeply powerful act of agency, provides further grounds for continued humanitarian assistance.
CONCLUSION
Sudan’s ongoing civil war presents one of the most dynamic, and demanding, challenges faced by contemporary international humanitarian organizations. Although beginning in 2023, it is evident that Sudan’s plight has long been in the making, consequently triggering one of the worst humanitarian crises in recent memory. As humanitarian response attempts to live up to its principles and provide the necessary relief, questions of efficacy and impact remain central to this discussion. Moreover, this article centers critical infrastructure assessment as both a pillar of humanitarian response and a vehicle for community empowerment.
Ultimately, in the face of changing conflict dynamics, interplay between humanitarianism and armed actors, and fluctuating access to infrastructure mapping tools, humanitarian response must remain flexible if it is to operate within Sudan. The invisibility of rural communities, regardless of their access or ownership of critical infrastructure, is a reality, albeit one which must be questioned not from the perspective of a hierarchy of importance in international assessment, but from humanitarian systems which hinder self monitoring and cooperative approaches to humanitarian crises.
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